

The EU and the Western Balkans: Modernism, Postnationalism and Postmodernism

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1. Introduction

Hello, my name is Goran Ilik, and I'm a associate professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law at "St. Kliment Ohridski" University in Bitola (North Macedonia). And I'm going to talk to you today about the EU and the Western Balkans considering the concepts of modernism, postmodernism, and postnationalism.

This lecture presents the key features of modernism, postmodernism and postnationalism as concepts, its modes and its theoretical implications in relation with the EU. The main intention is to present the EU postnational model as an agent for reconciliation of the Balkan region. The term reconciliation¹ in this lecture is used to describe the *reestablishment of friendly relations* amongst the Balkan nations.

Also, this lecture focuses on the possible forms of postnational networking of the Balkans, treated through the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the "Yugosphere".

As a first step, I will briefly introduce the concepts of balkanization vs. helvetization, the significance of the European Union as a model of postnational politics, the diffusion of the EU model of postnational integration worldwide, than the postnational impulses in the Balkans, especially aspectuated through the Southeast European Cooperation Process and the Yugosphere.

2. Balkanization vs. Helvetization

As far as the Balkans and all those negative labels (the "balkanization" syndrome) that adhere to it, but also the real negative experiences that the region is known for, is an inspiration for writing this chapter. In the academic literature the "balkanization" is frequently used to "denote the process of nationalist fragmentation of former geographic and political units into new and problematically viable small states" (Todorova, 2009, p. 32). The author Marija Todorova in the book "Imagining the Balkans" (2009) precisely explained this phenomenon: "'balkanize' means to break up into small, mutually hostile political units" (p. 33).

¹ Latin *reconciliatio* (a re-establishing, reinstatement, restoration, renewal), Retrieved 2018 from <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=reconciliatio>

The opposite term of “balkanization” is “helvetization”. That means a process of regional networking, cooperation, integration and *reconciliation* oriented towards the achievement of common objectives, such as peace, political stability, advancement of the human rights and freedoms, advancement of the rule of law, economic prosperity etc. This term derives from the Switzerland’s experience in overcoming the historical conflicts, crisis and wars, through the networking and integration of various national, cultural and linguistic groups, and thus, building a solid and institutionalized cooperation, today embodied in the Swiss Confederation (*Confoederatio Helvetica*).

But why the EU? Many authors treat the EU as a postmodern, poststatist and postnational model known worldwide.

The author Mohammed A. Bamyeh (2001) underlined: “the EU is treated as a model, because it clearly represents the most advanced institutional indicators of a postnational regional networking in the contemporary world”. The integration and governance literature, generally defines the notion of postnationalism as a process or trend by which nation-states and national identities lose their importance relative to supranational or global entities (Postnationalism, 2013).

Hence, the postnational impulses in the Balkans (following the EU example, directly or indirectly), are explored through the investigation of the postnational model of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEEC) and the “Yugosphere” as well.

As far as the SEEC, it is a formal type of regional cooperation of the Balkan countries, launched on their own initiative. While, the “Yugosphere” is term coined by the journalist Tim Judah (2009; 2010), implying the space that tend to become a free economic, trade and customs zone, liberated from the pressure of myths, historical tensions and political intrigues. By emulation of the EU postnational model by the Balkan countries, as well as the role of the EU as a postnational agent, the Balkans gets an opportunity for abandoning the syndrome of “balkanization” and finally placing itself in a peaceful and prosperous direction, restoring of its common memory – the memory of peace, regional ownership and prosperity.

2. The European Union: a model of postnational politics

I have to say immediately, that the European Union (EU) is not a nation-state, and therefore cannot be treated in a modern sense. According to Robert Cooper in “The Breaking of Nations” (2003), what “is called ‘modern’ is not so because it is something new – it is in fact very old fashioned – but because it is linked to that great engine of modernization, the nation-state” (Van Damme, 2013, p. 2). The modernity as a theory

typically refers to a “post-traditional, post-medieval historical period, one marked by the move from feudalism (or agrarianism) toward capitalism, industrialization, secularization, rationalization, the *nation-state* and its constituent institutions and forms of surveillance” (Barker 2005, p. 444). Or as theorist Anthony Giddens stressed: “[modernity] is associated with *a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy*” (1998, p. 94). Many theorists of modernity “focus upon the development of the *nation-state system* (...) the nation-state system has long participated in that reflexivity characteristic of modernity as a whole” (Giddens 1990, pp. 65-72).

The modernity is characteristic for Westphalian international order, established with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The series of peace treaties, “which ended the Thirty Years War, attenuated the sway of the Holy Roman Empire over subsidiary domains that were roughly unified by shared language and culture while separated by borders approximating those on the map today. The term scholars later assigned to these autonomous territories was ‘*nation-states*’” (Talbot, p. 2014). The Westphalian order brought “nationalism to the surface (...) Westphalia also perpetrated the fallacy of *absolute national sovereignty*” (Talbot, p. 2014). The author Mohammed A. Bamyeh stresses that European nationalism “had taught the world that nationalism must be embodied in the state and that each state should ideally stand for a distinct nation in the world” (2001, p. 3).

Under the pressures of globalization “the nation - states sovereignty was seriously intruded” (Bamyeh, 2001, p. 3). In this sense, the nation - states started, intentionally or unintentionally, to transmit their sovereign prerogatives to newly established global structures (e.g. UN, NATO etc.), in order to preserve their existence and to achieve a *higher, transcendental objectives*. This situation caused reflections about the possible new models of nation – state (understood in a modern terms as “heroic state”) challenging its meaning and its role in the contemporary global processes.

Contrary to that, the EU operates in a postmodern world, beyond the nation - state limits, as a *postnational, postmodern* and *poststatist* integration structure. According to Robert Cooper, *the EU is the best example of a postmodern space* (Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, 2009, p. 4). Given that, several factors distinguish it:

1. blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic politics;
2. voluntary mutual intrusiveness and mutual verification;
3. a complete repudiation of the use of force in settling disputes; and
4. security built on *transparency, mutual openness and interdependence* (Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, 2009, p. 5).

According to Robert Cooper, the postmodern state is one which is “more pluralist, more complex, less centralized than the bureaucratic modern state” (2009, p. 5), and thus, the

postnational integration of the postmodern state represents “the continuation of domestic concerns beyond national boundaries” (2009, p. 5). As regards the EU postnational and postmodern impetus, the author Rokas Grajauskas underlined that “the EU acts as an umbrella, placing EU Member States under a postmodern [and postnational] framework” (Grajauskas, 2011). Today, this debate has become less dominant in the integration literature, and “most scholars agree that the EU should be characterized as something in between an international organization and a federal state” (Rieker, 2007, p. 3). The consequence of this compromise has been that “the study of the EU has, to a large extent, shifted from the study of integration to the study of governance (...) defined as being about the exercise of authority with or without the formal institutions of [postnational] government” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 109). On many occasions, the theorist Hauke Brunkhorst pointed out, that the EU:

Constitutes a *poststatist* polity in which complex legal and regulatory tasks are regularly and effectively undertaken: *Europe represents a paradigmatic case*, and indeed decisive evolutionary breakthrough, underscoring the normative and institutional advantages of building complex modes of non-statist postnational decision making (Scheuerman, 2009, p. 43).

The integration and governance literature, generally defines the notion of postnationalism as a *process or trend by which nation states and national identities lose their importance relative to supranational or global entities* (Postnationalism, 2013). In that sense, the European integration can be defined as a “process of industrial, political, legal, economic (and in some cases social and cultural) *integration* of states” (Kosmas, 2010) focused on establishing a single postnational structure – the European Union.

Within that, The EU builds its postnational integration model on the institutionalized form of regional cooperation, and thus, solid interdependence between the Member States, taking into account its supranational, intergovernmental and transnational decision-making. Accordingly, the Member States, with building of the European postnational integration structure, not only supplement their national performances, but also gain and global power to act. In his book “Why Europe will run XXI century” (2005), the author Mark Leonard very skillfully describes, saying that: “by giving national governments a voice in the world, the EU has saved national democracy from becoming a mere talking shop that comments on global events while the real decisions are taken elsewhere” (p. 92). Thus, EU is “the only way that small countries can have a measure of control over global markets. This allows nation – states to make their own choices about what to do with their affairs” (Leonard, 2005, p. 92).

The author Mohammed A. Bamyeh underlined: “the EU is treated as a model, because it clearly represents the most advanced institutional indicators of a postnational regional networking in the contemporary world” (Bamyeh, 2001, p. 1). Bamyeh also concluded

that the model of postnational politics, as spearheaded by European integration relies upon the three principles, such as: 1) *interdependence*, 2) *diluted sovereignty* and 3) *the transformation of the state* into a technocracy devoid of all heroic or embodying claims (Bamyeh, 2001, p. 6).

The theorist Jürgen Habermas also stressed that the postnationalism “do not represents an aspiration for institutionalization of state or state-like structures” (Habermas, 2001, p. 57). Therefore, it should be treated as a process that *complements and supplements the performances of the nation-states*. Habermas also stressed that states “would hold onto some core elements of sovereignty as classically conceived, though the right to wage war and the protection of basic human rights would now be primarily located at the [postnational] level” (Scheuerman, 2009, p. 42).

While, the author Hauke Brunkhorst, as a model for successful postnational integration, takes into account the EU rule-making activity (and its judicial system), where such activity “occurs at the European level, [but] the enforcement and implementation of legislative and judicial decisions stays in the hands of nation-states. National courts implement European law, and nation-states maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force” (Scheuerman, 2009, p. 45). Hauke Brunkhorst declared that “the EU represents a *novel* and in decisive respects path breaking institutional experiment with [postnational] politics” (Scheuerman, 2009, p. 45). Likewise, the EU already possesses a coherent constitutional structure, though still in an insufficiently democratic form, and it exercises “the classic characteristics of sovereignty, albeit *without the state*” (Scheuerman, 2009, p. 45).

Within the integration and governance literature, this type of sovereignty is defined as *shared sovereignty*, which leads “to only institutional change without necessarily leading to wholesale domestic change; a state may only surrender *part* of its policymaking authority in an issue area to the supranational body” (Mamudu and Studlar, 2010, p. 4). Namely, the nation-state does not have the sole authority over policy but is *disaggregated (diluted)* “composed of state officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), judges, commissions, and concerned citizens coming together to foment change. Phenomena such as globalization, interdependence, and regional integration have diminished the ability of states to be self-reliant, and as a result international institutions have emerged to deal with many issues that *transcend national boundaries, leading to shared sovereignty*” (Mamudu; Studlar, 2010, p. 4).

On that basis, many theorists concluded the EU’s credentials as a *novel postmodern and poststatist political order*, which in the same time, serves as a model of postnational networking and integration worldwide. Postmodern (and postnational) actors are “generally striving to establish a post-Westphalian order where state sovereignty is

constrained through legal developments beyond the nation-state” (Sjursen 2007, p. 2). In a post-Westphalian order “foreign policy transcends the state-centric view of international relations” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, p. 20). As a result, the affirmation of *norms* and *values* is becoming equally important as the affirmation of national interests. Whereas, the foreign policy in the Westphalian (modern) age, “[is] characterized by states as the main actors, by a clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics, by the protection of sovereignty and by the pursuit of national interest, power and *raison d’état*” (Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas 2009, p. 4). Unlike the modern (Westphalian) concept of national interests (*raison d’état*), I can qualify the EU postnational interests as *value* interests (*raison de valeur*) (Ilik 2012, p. 160), derived from the values stipulated in the EU constitutive treaties.

Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty noted that the EU's actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired “its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law” (The Lisbon Treaty 2008).

This provision confirms that the EU shall define and pursue its common policies and actions and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to achieve the following objectives: “(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter” (The Lisbon Treaty 2008).

3. Diffusion of the EU model of postnational integration worldwide

As regards the diffusion of the EU model of postnational integration worldwide, I will briefly present the example of South American Market or the *Mercosur* (*Mercado Común del Sur*), in order to reveal the significance of the EU’s model for encouraging a variety of modes of postnational networking and integration. Therefore, the *Mercosur* was established “when the leaders of the big countries in the [South America] region saw the enormous advances being made in Europe with the creation of the Single European Market. The origins of the alliance come from attempt to defuse the prickly relations between Brazil and Argentina – as recently as the 1970s – they were engaged in a nuclear arms race. But what started as a bilateral initiative between these two countries was broadened to include Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991 when *Mercosur* was formed (Chile and Bolivia joined as associate members in 1996)” (Leonard, 2005, p. 136).

Consequently, the Member States agreed to form a common market with coordinated macro-economic policies in various sectors, including foreign trade, agricultural, industrial and fiscal. They also “committed themselves to harmonize their legislation and create political and economic integration (...) the *Mercosur* has a political structure *that is loosely modeled on the EU*” (Leonard, 2005, p. 136). Namely, the creation of *Mercosur*, as Mark Leonard stated “had put the region on the world business map. But possibly the biggest success in the role that *Mercosur* has played in defending and *strengthening democracy* in South America’s southern cone” (Leonard, 2005, p. 137).

Observing the global trends, it can be concluded that Latin America is not alone. In Africa is established African Union, while Middle Eastern summits talk about the possibility of the Arab Union. East Asia has ASEAN and the Shanghai Co-operation. South Asia has SAARC (Leonard, 2005, p. 136). The Pacific region has APEC, while the North America has developed NAFTA and the Free Trade Area of the Americas to match the growing European Single Market. Starting from that, I can draw two basic types of postnationalism - direct and indirect postnationalism.

Both the EU and the *Mercosur*, can be treated as a representatives of direct type of postnationalism, established *directly* by the nation – states as the ultimate structure of postnational integration, derived from their postnational networking and shared sovereignty. Therefore, some authors believe that through the postnational integration, the nation-states are transformed into Member States, taking into account the fact that they surrender a part of their sovereignty to the postnational structure, in particular sectors (trade, economy, security and defense etc.) (Figure 1.).




Figure 1: Direct postnationalism (Source: my own depiction, referring to data collected from the analysis of EU postnational model)

While, the indirect type of postnationalism, in particular, it will be explored through the analysis of the postnational networking impulses of the Balkans, such as the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the “Yugosphere”, in order to reveal the EU role as an agent for reconciliation of the Balkans.

4. The postnational impulses in the Balkans

As far as the Balkans and projections for establishment of some form of a Balkan postnational network or regional cooperation, the situation is unclear and very complex to discuss. In that sense, I need to mention the “balkanization” syndrome, frequently used to “denote the process of nationalist fragmentation of former geographic and political units into new and problematically viable small states” (Todorova, 2009, p. 32). Consequently, the author Marija Todorova in the book “Imagining the Balkans” (2009) precisely explained this phenomenon: “‘balkanize’ means to break up into small, mutually hostile political units” (p. 33).

In order to avoid or to prevent such destructive national behavior of the Balkan states, several significant regional initiatives were established: CEFTA 2006, Adriatic Charter, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Energy Community, Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and many other formal or informal. All these regional initiatives are oriented towards the post-conflict consolidation, reconciliation and integration of the Balkan region into the Euro – Atlantic structures.

In this lecture, I will present only the *Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP)* as a formal type of regional cooperation, and the concept of the “*Yugosphere*” as an informal type of regional cooperation. The latter is significant in sense of affirmation of the *natural network of regional cooperation* between the nations and states of the Balkans, especially the former SFR Yugoslavia region. Therefore, I will try to introduce the role of the EU as an agent for reconciliation of the Balkans.

But I need to emphasize that the process of postnational networking of the Balkans, should not be treated in terms of nation-building or establishment of some kind of a Balkan federation, but through the prism of the regional initiatives and situation on the terrain such as the SEECP or the “Yugosphere”. The first one is broader, and includes the whole Balkans as a region. While the second one, is smaller, and includes only the states derived from the former SFR Yugoslavia. The first one represents an institution, while the second one, a situation.

5. The Southeast European Cooperation Process

As far as the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), it is a formal type of regional cooperation of the Balkan countries, *launched on their own initiative*. All Balkan countries, plus Slovenia and Moldova, are Member States of the SEECP.

The constitutive document of this regional cooperation is the “Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in the Balkans”, which outlined the four priorities of regional cooperation:

1. *Regional security*: enhancing good-neighborliness and mutual trust;
2. *Economic growth*: developing economic cooperation by encouraging cross-border cooperation, improving the transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure and the general investment climate;
3. *Social and cultural development*: promotion of humanitarian cooperation by improving social and cultural communication between countries; and
4. *Legal affairs and fight against crime*: cooperation in the field of justice, combating organized crime and illegal trade in weapons and drugs, and fighting terrorism (Development of the SEECP, 2013).

On that basis, the Member States declared their aim: “[to] create a [Southeast Europe] whose future lies in peace, democracy, economic prosperity and full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures” (The Sofia Declaration, 1996). Likewise, the Prime Ministers of the Member States, committed themselves for “[the transformation of] the region into an area of stability, security and cooperation (...) [considering] the prospects for multilateral cooperation in European perspective and as deriving from the common aspirations of each country of the region to integrate into Europe” (The Sofia Declaration, 1996).

As the next important step, regarding the improvement of the SEECP was adoption of the “Bucharest Charter”. This Charter, more clearly outlined the objectives of regional cooperation: 1) Enhancement of political and security cooperation; 2) Fostering economic cooperation; and 3) Enlargement of cooperation in the fields of human dimension, democracy, justice and combating illegal activities (The Bucharest Charter, 2000). Analogously, the Member States reaffirmed their strong belief that “the *European and Euro-Atlantic integration* is essential in promoting [of their] common objectives and cannot be complete without the participation of all of [the SEECP] countries”.

In order to achieve more institutionalized cooperation in the region, the SEECP states established the *Regional Cooperation Council (RCC)* and the *Regional secretariat for parliamentary cooperation in SEE (RSPC SEE)*. The RCC is oriented towards the improvement of mutual confidence between the Balkan states as a basis for acquisition of *the sense for regional ownership*. Within that, the RCC provided operational capacities with focus on the priority areas of economic and social development, energy and

infrastructure, justice and home affairs, security cooperation, building human capital, and parliamentary cooperation as an overarching theme.

While, in the Final Declaration of the 6th Conference in Zagreb, the SEECP Speakers of the Parliaments emphasized the significance of “the European standards of dialogue, tolerance and cooperation (...) and the regional ownership principle (...) fully aware of the important role and responsibility of the National Parliaments in the process of enhancing regional cooperation” (The Zagreb Declaration, 2007). Adopting the “Zagreb Declaration”, the SEECP Heads of State and Government, stressed the importance of parliamentary cooperation “as an indispensable segment of the regional cooperation” (The Zagreb Declaration, 2007).

Hence, the SEECP is an *extensive* form of regionalism, starting from its “large range of areas cooperation” (Luciana-Alexandra, 2008, p. 246). It represents a *consultative* and *ad hoc political dialogue*, in accordance with the Annex to the “Bucharest Charter”, which stipulates the principle of consensus (unanimity) in decision – making. Within the SEECP, there are no dominant actors, so it is *plural initiative* (Luciana-Alexandra, 2008). That was enabled with the adoption of the “Joint statement by the Heads of State and Government of countries of Southeastern Europe”, which precisely stressed that the SEECP will operate “on a mutual and equal basis” (The Joint Statement, 1997). Despite “the Bulgarian, Greek and Romanian attempts to brand themselves as regional leaders, no state or group of states seems to be leading the initiative” (Luciana-Alexandra, 2008, p. 243). Considering the solidarity between the Member States, the SEECP is *declarative* regional cooperation, because the solidarity still rests on a rhetorical level, for example: Greece vetoed Macedonian NATO accession in 2008 instead to support it (Table 1.).

Table 1: The SEECP attributes (Source: my own depiction, referring to data collected from the analysis of SEECP model)

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	TYPE	OBSERVATIONS
Scope	Extensive	Initially focused on political and economic coordination but currently there is more emphasis on areas from the other sectors of security, most notable from the societal one.
Number of dominant actor within the arrangement	Plural	No member dominated the agenda.
Division of powers between the initiative and the Member States	Consultative	Although it has increasingly promoted policy-oriented cooperation, it has remained mainly a forum for political consultation.

Degree of institutionalization	<i>Ad hoc</i> Political dialogue	Despite discussions on the matter, the initiative has not been institutionalized in any way.
Financial sources and resources	Fully supported	All the SEECP activities, <i>mainly high level reunions</i> , are financed by the member states.
Solidarity and support of the group member	Declarative	The solidarity as such is still on a declarative and rhetorical level, for example: Greece vetoed Macedonian NATO accession in 2008 instead to support it
Civil society	Not supports	It's a highly top-down type of regional initiative.
Political will	Declarative	There is no political activity to demonstrate the real efforts of the SEECP member states for the future improvement or evolution of the SEECP.

The “Yugosphere”

The journalist of the eminent magazine “The Economist”, Tim Judah, coins the term “Yugosphere”, implying the space that tend to become a free economic, trade and customs zone, liberated from the pressure of myths, specifically the pressures of the historical tensions and political intrigues. From Slovenia to Macedonia, “despite all their differences, the people of this region have an awful lot in common, and while the idea of a ‘Yugosphere’ has never been formally articulated until now, it has clearly emerged in recent years” (Judah, 2009, p. 2). In that context, Judah stressed that “Yugosphere” derives from the fact that “the vast majority of the 22 million or so people who live in the region of the former Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Montenegrins all speak the same language with minor dialectical variations. At either end of it many Macedonians and Slovenes either still speak what used to be called Serbo-Croatian or understand it” (Judah, 2009, p. 3).

In addition, every year thousands of young people from the region (and now of course everywhere) “come together at the Exit music festival in Novi Sad. Anyone interested in literature can keep up to date by following the quintessential Yugoslpheric site, *Knizevnost.org* and all serious business websites cover the whole of the ex-Yugoslavia as a matter of course, all of them tracking the stock markets of Zagreb, Belgrade, Podgorica and so on” (Judah, 2009, p. 9). Every year people across Europe “gnash their teeth at the Eurovision song contest when the former Yugoslavs, (just like the Scandinavians, the former Soviets, and Greeks and Cypriots,) band together to vote for one another. But then, it could hardly be any other way. Most former Yugoslavs like the same music as they do much of the same food” (Judah, 2009, p. 8).

The previous mentioned SEECP and the RCC, also include the “Yugosphere”. To understand this properly one has to read between the lines. Membership of the RCC

includes “all the countries of South East Europe, or the seven post-Yugoslav states, (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro,) plus Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Albania and Turkey” (Judah, 2009, p. 14). However, Turkey has little “really to do with the RCC and Bulgaria, Romania and Greece are already members of the EU and NATO. Slovenia too is already a member of the EU and NATO but by virtue of its history and intense commercial links with the rest of the former Yugoslavia can be nothing else but a part of the Yugosphere” (Judah, 2009, p. 8). Albania is clearly not, but it is a part of the Western Balkans, “which is defined as the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania” (Judah, 2009, p. 15).

Judah concludes that the emergence of the “Yugosphere” is certainly, “a good thing but let us not be starry-eyed about it” (Judah, 2009, p. 27). However, the usage of this term provoked an avalanche of negative reactions by the political elites of the Balkan countries, and thus, Judah pointed out that the term “Yugosphere” *do not* imply new Yugoslavia, but:

The prefix ‘Yugo-’ can simultaneously symbolize love and fear, anger and need, past and future. I understand that many cannot swallow word Yugosphere. But to ask why. Not only because the prefix ‘Yugo-’, but also because of the deep emotional problems that opens. You will admit that people do not perceive the Macedonians, Slovenes and Bosnians as quite strangers as Austrians or Greeks, but if we move a step further, how to touch a nerve (Judah, 2010).

The idea of this term, says Judah, derives from the reality that it is evident, although many do not want to see it. In the interest of clarification of this term, he resolutely pointed out: “call it Yugosphere, ‘region’, ‘zone’, Adriatic whatever it is, no one cares.

The former Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Hido Bišćević, very accurately describes the phenomenon of the “Yugosphere” and its perspectives as an impulse of postnational networking of the Balkans. Within that, Bišćević stressed five aspects, as challenges of the Balkan region and the need for its postnational networking:

Firstly, delays are evident and sometimes worrisome in many sectors - energy, infrastructure, and railways are examples only. **Secondly**, any attempt to attract investments solely on a national basis for such large and necessary projects is obviously difficult and time-consuming. **Thirdly**, in the background of the current crisis which will not disappear overnight, there is an obvious need for a rapid, innovative and courageous response to prevent further negative impact, such as further increase of unemployment rate; and let me briefly outline only this aspect - a prolonged period of rising unemployment compounded by unresolved political issues and widespread social uncertainty may lead to serious threats. **Fourthly**, major changes in international relations gradually lead to

marginalization of the region on the scale of global political interests and, therefore, a kind of ‘self-help’ is a logical necessity (Zvijerac, 2011, p. 3).

On that basis, I can define the “Yugosphere” as 1) a socio-economic phenomenon, 2) based on linguistic, cultural, national and territorial proximity of the people and states 3) treated in an apolitical sense, 4) strongly accompanied by the aspirations for full integration of the remaining Balkan states into the EU (Table 2.).

Table 1: The Yugosphere attributes (Source: my own depiction, referring to data collected from the analysis of the Yugosphere model)

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	TYPE	OBSERVATIONS
Scope	Extensive	Socio-economic phenomenon, based on linguistic, cultural, national and territorial proximity of the people and states.
Number of dominant actor within the arrangement	Plural	No actor dominated the agenda.
Division of powers between the initiative and the Member States	///	///
Degree of institutionalization	Informal and apolitical	The initiative has not been institutionalized in any way.
Financial sources and resources	Not supported	///
Solidarity and support of the group member	Declarative	The solidarity as such is still on a declarative and rhetorical level, mostly articulated through the need for joining the EU.
Civil society	Not supports	///
Political will	Declarative	There is no political will to demonstrate the real efforts of the “Yugosphere” states for future institutional integration outside the EU.

It can be emphasized that the impulses of postnational networking of the Balkans, imply the existence of an *indirect type of postnationalism*. This type of postnationalism can be defined as a process of postnational networking in particular sectors (economy, trade, culture, security etc.), not focused on building an ultimate postnational structure, but incorporation of such network into already established postnational structures (Figure 2.).

Given the ultimate objective of the SEECP and the countries of the “Yugosphere” as well, undoubtedly it can be concluded that in both cases, the full integration into the EU, appears as the only and ultimate objective of the Balkans.




Figure 2: Indirect postnationalism (Source: my own depiction, referring to data collected from the analysis of SEECP and “Yugosphere”)

6. Conclusion

The primary aim of this lecture, was introducing of the varieties of postnational networking, while adding the model of the EU as an agent for postnational networking and integration. It can be concluded that both, the concept of networking and the concept of integration, are similar concepts. The networking mostly refers to the loosely established regional cooperation forms, while the concept of integration, refers to higher and post-statist level, which incorporates in itself the parts of Member States sovereignty (shared sovereignty). Accordingly, I identified two types of postnationalism - direct and indirect type of postnationalism.

The direct type of postnationalism manifests itself with strong interdependence of the Member States, diluted and disaggregated sovereignty and transformation of the nation – states in Member States, as it is explained with the EU postnational integration.

The indirect postnationalism is connected with the concept of networking, explained through the mutually intertwined regional cooperation forms, such as the SEECP and the “Yugosphere”.

The SEECP succeeded to affirm the parameters of postnational networking, confirmed

by loose regional cooperation in the following areas: regional security, democracy, economic growth, social and cultural development, and legal affairs and fight against crime. So, the SEECIP strongly anticipate the EU values, the significance of the regional ownership, and full integration of the Balkans into the EU, rather than building a separate legal personality of the same. Also, it must be stressed that this postnational network is strongly top-down type of regional cooperation, mainly driven by the states and their political elites.

As regards the “Yugosphere”, it can be concluded that this form of indirect postnational networking can be defined as a socio-economic phenomenon, based on linguistic, cultural, national and territorial proximity of the people and states of the Balkans, understood in strictly apolitical sense, with strong desire for integration into the EU.

On that basis, it arises that the Balkan states are “forced” to cooperate with each other, in order to achieve their common objective – their full integration into the EU, which strongly confirms the role of the EU as an extremely strong cohesive substance for final reconciliation of the Balkans.